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Abstract—BGP data contains artifacts introduced by the mea-
surement infrastructure which can substantially affect analysis.
This is especially important in operational systems where “crying
wolf” will result in an operator ignoring alarms. In this paper,
we investigate the causes of measurement artifacts in BGP data
— cross-checking and using properties of the data to infer the
presence of an artifact and minimize its impact.
We have developed a prototype tool, CleanBGP, which detects
and corrects the effects of artifacts in BGP data, which we believe
should be used prior to the analysis of such data. CleanBGP
provides the user with an understanding of the artifacts present,
a mechanism to remove their effects, and consequently the
limitations of results can be fully quantified.
I. INTRODUCTION
BGP data is collected to analyze the dynamic changes to
a router’s view of the Internet. However, the measurement
infrastructure can introduce undesirable artifacts, for instance
missing or re-ordered updates, partially recorded tables and
monitoring-link failures. Automated systems which frequently
report anomalies merely as a result of measurement artifacts
are not acceptable, and will be ignored by network opera-
tors. In this paper, we cross-check BGP data to verify it is
consistent, and in cases when it is not, use ‘clues’ contained
in the data to discover the source of the inconsistency and
ameliorate its impact on the data. BGP data has been used for
many network management tasks such as debugging routing
problems [1], anomaly detection [2] and policy inference [3]
as well as router table analysis [4], [5]. However, all analyses
require an inherent understanding of the input data together
with its limitations. This understanding must be built-in to
any tool usable by operators and forms the motivation for the
design of the pre-processing tool described in this paper —
CleanBGP.
It might be easy to argue “improve the measurement
apparatus”. Obviously, we would like equipment to be as
accurate as possible, and improvements to such equipment
are complementary to our work. However, regardless of such
improvements, it is vital — particularly in operational systems
— to calibrate the accuracy of all measurement devices [6].
The initial hypothesis of all measurement apparatus should
be that it is flawed, and data taken from the apparatus can be
considered accurate only when this hypothesis has been proved
false. We have limited resources for such calibration, however
we do have the capability to perform consistency checks on
the data. It is this methodology that has allowed us to detect
some artifacts that would never otherwise have been found
through a “hunt and peck” approach.
The goal of collecting BGP data is to record the state of
a single BGP router in the Internet. In-order to analyze this
data, it must be recorded on disk where it can be processed
offline. This can be done on the routers themselves, but
this option is typically not chosen as it requires significant
resources and can impact the operational stability of the router.
Hence, collecting BGP data is undertaken with a more passive
approach. A software route monitor establishes a BGP session
with the operational router, possibly over multiple physical
links. The operational router sends all its best path updates to
the monitor as if it were part of the Internet’s routing system.
The monitor records this data to disk. Each component of the
measurement infrastructure can fail. For instance, there can
be bugs in the monitor implementation causing updates to not
be recorded [7], or recorded non-chronologically — which
is undesirable due to the hard-state nature of BGP. Further,
the BGP session between the monitor and the router can fail
causing missed updates, and during the re-establishment of
the session a BGP update storm occurs as all routes are re-
advertised. Including these updates in further analyses can
result in starkly different conclusions [8].
Our methodology, which forms the basis for CleanBGP has
several stages. First, we examine how the data is collected
and explain how cross-checking the data can highlight the
presence of measurement artifacts (Section II). Second, if a
measurement artifact (described in Section III) is detected
based on its characteristics (Section IV), we use techniques
presented in Section V to estimate the interval affected and
determine its source. Finally, we either exclude the data from
further analysis or estimate the actual routing behavior using
techniques based on the classification of the measurement
artifact (Section VI).
Measurement artifacts are binary in nature. They are either
present or not. However, no binary indicator is available to
inform us of their presence. Hence, CleanBGP uses multiple
characteristics of the data for detection. In Section VIII we
investigate the frequency of detected artifacts and their effect
on the measured data. We find our consistency check detects
problems in 5% of cases with 81% of these caused by updates
recorded in non-chronological order. A further 10% were
caused by session resets, however, our approach also discov-
ered resets occurred frequently even when no inconsistencies
were present. Analysis of BGP data may or may not be
substantially affected by some artifacts. However, knowledge
of their existence is vital so a judgement on their effect can be
made. CleanBGP may form a pre-processing step to any BGP
analysis such as a monitoring system [9], or other network
management tasks.
II. DATA CONSISTENCY
BGP data is collected to represent the routing state of a
router at a given time. This state is unique. Consequently, any
data representing this state should be consistent and is the
basis of the check outlined in this section.
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Policy Unchanged Policy Changed Incomplete Missing Update
Session Reset Session Reset Table Updates Ordering
Additional prefixes in constructed table + + X + +
Different prefixes in constructed table + +
Missing prefixes in constructed table + +
Almost simultaneous updates for inconsistent prefixes X
Oldest prefix during inter-table interval X X
No routing activity for extended period + + +
Burst of unique prefixes X X
Burst of duplicate updates X
State Information + +
TABLE I
DATA CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASUREMENT ARTIFACTS. LEGEND: X CHARACTERISTIC NECESSARY FOR ARTIFACT PRESENCE. + CHARACTERISTIC
STRONGLY INDICATIVE (BUT NOT NECESSARY) FOR ARTIFACT PRESENCE.
Current generation routers support the real-time collection
of routing changes. However the mechanism it uses (via the
debug command) is resource intensive and requires admin-
istrator access to the router. Hence, it is often not enabled on
operational routers. The current best-practice to determine a
router’s current view of the Internet is for a software router
(for instance Quagga [10] or OpenBGPD [11]) to be used as a
route monitor. The monitor establishes a BGP session with an
operational router, which treats the monitor as any other router.
Subsequently, all changes to the operational router’s best route
are announced along the session to the monitor, which records
these changes to disk and periodically dumps an entire table.
This BGP update collection procedure is undertaken by public
route monitors [12], [13] as well as internally by ISPs [14].
The two types of BGP data collected — tables and updates
— are views of the same system. Consequently, they should be
consistent. BGP is a hard-state routing protocol, where updates
are only sent once. Thus, constructing a table at time t2 by
combining the table at some time t1, and all updates received in
the interval [t1, t2] should be consistent with the table recorded
at time t21. This was not always the case in recorded BGP
data. However, we were able to characterize the causes of
inconsistencies into four main types of measurement artifacts
and use characteristics of the data to detect them (detailed in
Sections III and IV).
III. MEASUREMENT ARTIFACTS
Measurement artifacts occur when the data stored by the
monitor does not reflect the real state of the router under
observation. In this section we consider the artifacts we
unearthed and their characteristics, a summary of which is
included in Table I.
A. Session Failures and Resets
The collection of updates relies on a BGP session between
the route monitor and an operational router. If this session
fails, no updates are recorded during the failure interval and the
consistency check may fail. Monitor sessions are particularly
vulnerable to failures as they often use multi-hop sessions
(that cross multiple physical links) and are more vulnerable to
timeouts as a result of link congestion. When the session is re-
established, the entire table is re-advertised, resulting in a large
influx of routing updates. These updates are not representative
of changes in the observed network. Such updates can even
cause a “BGP update storm” [8] that is not real!
1In addition, table dumps are not atomic. They take a period of time to
write to disk – from several seconds to minutes depending on the size and
number of monitored router tables. We do not consider any difference caused
by an update arriving during this time as a failed table consistency check.
B. Incomplete Tables
It is possible that a routing table is not fully written to disk.
Consequently, the table is not representative of the operational
router’s view of the Internet.
C. Missing Updates
Kong [7] discovered some updates were not decoded by
the monitor and consequently would be missing from both
the update stream and recorded tables. This bug has since
been corrected. However, if an entry is in a recorded table
(indicating it has been decoded), but not in the update stream,
then update files may be corrupted. This occurred for almost
an hour on Jan 21, 2007 at RIPE route monitor RRC01.
D. Update Ordering
We discovered that when updates occur almost simulta-
neously (on the order of seconds), the ordering of updates
was not consistent with the recorded table. This may be a
bug in the software. For this analysis we assume the updates
were recorded in the incorrect order. The alternative is that
updates were applied in the incorrect order to the table
— more concerning as the table would then represent an
invalid routing state. Software routers are used in some cases
as replacements for operational routers to reduce costs. An
operational router with an invalid state can seriously affect
network performance. To determine which alternative is the
cause, an external monitoring technique such as a wire-tap
would be required and is beyond the scope of this work.
E. Other Artifacts
Several other artifacts were discovered whilst analyzing
the consistency of data. On some occasions, such as in
the table recorded at RRC00 on May 1, 2008 for the pre-
fix 84.205.80.0/24, two routes learned from the neighbor
202.12.29.64 are recorded even though BGP does not allow
this. One route appears to be valid (the second has a null
AS number and no AS Path). Further, no update for the
second route is recorded in the update stream. Interestingly,
in a later table, this entry is replaced, without being explicitly
withdrawn, by a route learned from neighbor 193.136.5.1 with
a null AS and the same originating time. The new route is
replaced later again by a route from 12.0.1.63 (with AS7018)
and a new originating time — although the update is not
present in the update stream and the consistency check fails.
Another artifact we discovered was when updates were not
applied to the table. This occurred to several tables recorded
at RRC00 on April 30, 2008. Here, we discovered several
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hundred updates occurring up to hours before the recorded
table time and not applied to the table. This is confirmed
by the originating time of the routes in the recorded table.
This could be caused by the re-ordering of updates, however,
the timestamp of the consecutive updates is much further
apart than any other observed update re-ordering (minutes in
contrast to seconds). Consequently, we believe some updates
may not have been applied to the table. A table recorded on
this day also took over 20 minutes to write to disk indicating
a possible monitor failure. Other tables from the same monitor
generally took less than 20 seconds to write to disk.
A third artifact we discovered was the alteration of orig-
inating AS. For example at RRC01 on Jan 25, 2007 the
originating AS of the prefix 203.10.62.0/24 recorded in the
table is AS23456. However, updates indicate it is AS2.2. This
may be an issue with the software router or data recording
process.
IV. DETECTING ARTIFACTS
The consistency check outlined in Section II is able to
detect many inconsistencies. However, consistent data does
not necessarily indicate an interval is free from measurement
artifacts. Hence, we use multiple characteristics from the data
to detect and classify measurement artifacts (see Table I).
A. Table Comparison
The consistency check outlined in Section II is also a
characteristic we can use to detect artifacts. If a session
reset occurs between two successive table dumps, additional
prefixes may be in the constructed table when compared to
the second recorded table. Consider the example in Fig. 1.
We construct the table at time t2 by applying the updates
in chronological order to the table at t1. However, during a
period of downtime several updates on the operational router
(W1, W5, A2) are not recorded on the route monitor. All
prefixes in the table after the downtime are sent to the monitor.
Hence, the withdrawals (W1, W5) are not recorded on the
route monitor and thus if not re-advertised before a table is
recorded, will result in differences between the constructed and
recorded table at time t2. Note that missing announcements
(such as A2) will be delayed as they are announced during the
re-establishment. If an announcement of a prefix withdrawn
during the downtime occurs after the downtime (such as A5),
the missing withdrawal W5 will not cause a data inconsistency.
Session resets are not the only cause of a table comparison
failure. Any prefix without an equivalent route in both the
constructed and recorded tables may be affected by non-
chronological recording of updates. If an update occurs ‘almost
simultaneously’ to the last update received, then we declare it
as responsible for the inconsistency.
If there are missing or different routes in the constructed
table, and the non-chronological ordering of routes cannot
account for any discrepancies, it is likely that updates have
not been recorded. If additional prefixes are in the constructed
table, but other characteristics discount the possibility of a
session reset, then it is likely that the recorded table is
incomplete.
Fig. 1. The recorded table (shaded) at time t2 is compared to a table
constructed (dashed) from the table at t1 and all updates recorded in the
interval [t1, t2] . The announcement of prefix 1 is annotated by A1. The
withdrawal of prefix 1 is annotated by W1 and so forth.
B. Oldest Prefix
Session resets cause the entire table of the operational router
to be re-advertised. Consequently, if a session reset occurs at
a time t1, the oldest prefix in the recorded table at time t2
can not be prior to t1. However, we cannot assume that a
session reset occurred at the timestamp of the oldest-prefix.
Normal routing operation will result in all prefixes being re-
announced at some point and we cannot say a session reset
definitely occurred at the time of the oldest-prefix. However,
a majority of the prefixes in the table are stable [5], [15].
Consequently, with regular snapshots (RIPE records them at
8 hour intervals) if the oldest prefix lies between the current
and previous table snapshots, it is indicative that a session
reset has actually occurred.
C. State Information
State information is included in some data sources to
indicate the up and down times of a BGP session. However,
state information can be missing and does not identify other
measurement artifacts. Further, in monitors such as Route-
Views state information is not even recorded. This information
is used in CleanBGP by default, but for the purposes of this
analysis, it is used purely as validation of session resets.
D. Downtime
BGP undergoes constant changes, so a long period where
no updates are received can be indicative of a session reset or a
failure to write to disk. However, receiving no announcements
for a period of time may be part of normal routing behavior,
especially in BGP tables with a relatively small number
of prefixes. The recording of keep-alives — messages sent
specifically to keep a BGP session alive during low routing
activity — allows a low downtime threshold to be set, enabling
the detection of measurement artifacts as early as possible.
E. Session Re-establishment
When a BGP session is re-established after a failure, all
routes in the table are re-announced as fast as possible. The
session re-establishment phase has two main characteristics:-
a large number of prefixes announced in a short interval and
a large number of non-table altering (or duplicate) updates.
BGP changes occur frequently but only to a subset of
prefixes [15]. Hence, the table after a session failure is likely
to be similar — however not necessarily identical — to the
table prior to a session failure. If a large number of unique
prefixes2 are announced in a short interval it is indicative of
a session re-establishment. In addition, as a large number of
2Defined by counting only one of the collection of announcements for each
prefix in the given interval; this removes the effect of highly active prefixes.
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Fig. 2. ‘S’ indicates a suspicious interval. The detected interval is the largest
contiguous collection of suspicious bins and isolated non-suspicious bins that
include the detection time.
routes do not change, a substantial number of updates will not
affect the routes in the constructed table (policy-unchanged
reset). We define such updates as duplicate announcements.
If an administrator of the operational router changes policy
during the downtime, the number of duplicate announcements
may be low (policy-changed reset).
A re-establishment after a session failure may not be com-
plete due to a persistent failure resulting in multiple partial
re-establishments. However, in this case, we are likely to see
a substantial number of duplicate announcements, or a long
downtime. The technique of Zhang et al. [16] does not account
for such cases. Unlike other characteristics, thresholds are
required for the session re-establishment characteristic. This
threshold must be high enough not to classify normal routing
operation as a measurement artifact, but must be low enough
to ensure we do not miss any artifacts. We outline how we
obtain these thresholds in Section VII.
We use all of the above characteristics to detect mea-
surement artifacts in BGP data sources. CleanBGP uses a
sliding window on the update stream to initially detect a
measurement artifact — an extended downtime or a burst
of unique prefixes/duplicate announcements is indicative that
a measurement artifact may be occurring. State information
can also be used to detect session failures. When a table is
available for comparison, we compare the constructed table
with the recorded table and examine the oldest prefix in the
table for further evidence as to whether a measurement artifact
(and what type) occurred during the interval between the
previous and current table. When a measurement artifact is
detected, CleanBGP enters the localization phase.
V. LOCALIZATION IN TIME OF MEASUREMENT ARTIFACTS
Session resets and missing updates are artifacts that span a
period of time. The detection of these measurement artifacts
simply indicates that a measurement artifact is occurring. The
second phase of CleanBGP is to localize the affected interval.
Our desire is to precisely identify all data that is representative
of the operational router’s behavior and all data which is not.
However, this is difficult when there are no markers in the
data to indicate which data is representative. State information
recorded in some data sources can provide a starting point,
however state information can be delayed, missing and does
not indicate the conclusion of the re-establishment phase3.
For other measurement artifacts, no meta-data is available and
cross-referencing the data is our only feasible option.
If the sliding window detects a possible measurement arti-
fact, we localize it by considering small disjoint bins surround-
ing the detected time. If a bin contains no updates/keep-alives
or a large number of unique prefixes/duplicate announcements,
we declare the bin as suspicious. We localize the measurement
3An End-of-RIB marker is proposed in [17].
artifact as the largest contiguous collection of suspicious bins
and isolated non-suspicious bins that include the detection
time. Over-estimation of the affected interval is preferred to
under-estimation as we want to provide a guaranteed level of
accuracy in the data.
The above technique for localizing the interval affected by
session resets and missing updates is ideal for applications
requiring real-time data (such as network monitoring tools).
However, some measurement artifacts may not be detected by
such a threshold based technique. When a table is available
for comparison it may have characteristics of a session reset
or missing updates. If this is the case, and the sliding window
was unable to precisely identify the affected interval, we con-
servatively declare the entire interval between two successive
tables part of a measurement artifact. Other artifacts such as
re-ordered updates are only able to be detected by examining a
recorded table. If such an artifact is detected, no localization is
required and the process moves directly to the cleaning phase.
VI. CLEANING DATA
We must be very cautious when cleaning data to avoid
unnecessarily altering data. To this end, we ‘mark’ updates and
table entries which we alter and clearly identify the interval
cleaned. Consequently, applications using the BGP data can
determine what data to include or exclude.
The most obvious form of data cleaning is exclusion —
removing any interval affected by measurement artifacts from
further analysis. This would be ideal for applications sensitive
to large numbers of updates or long periods of downtime and
is the approach we recommend if contiguous routing updates
are not required. However, as many applications require a
continuous stream of data this is not always an attractive
solution. Thus, we now introduce a new technique for the
estimation of routing behavior during measurement artifacts.
A. Session Resets
Removing all duplicate announcements has been used to
minimize the effect of session resets [15], [18]–[20]. Dupli-
cates reflect no change in the routing state, however they can
be caused by internal AS routing changes [8], [21]. We mark
all duplicate announcements as part of a measurement artifact
only during a detected session reset interval. Thus, we alter the
minimal amount of data and ensure all updates which reflect
routing changes during the downtime are still present in the
data although they may be delayed. We mark all other updates
during this interval as being possibly delayed.
Prefixes may be withdrawn on the operational router during
the downtime of a session. These ‘ghost’ withdrawals are only
noticed when comparing a constructed table to a recorded table
as the recorded table will not include the prefixes withdrawn
during the downtime. Hence, we can assume these prefixes
were withdrawn during a session reset and consequently
estimate the time the withdrawals occurred (at the conclusion
of the session reset interval). If multiple session resets occur
during a single inter-table interval, withdrawals are placed
where they are consistent with multiple session failures.
B. Incomplete Tables
A table at any time is able to be constructed from updates
and a previous table. Any table not completely recorded to
disk can hence be ignored.
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C. Missing Updates
If missing updates are detected, it is possible to estimate
the actual routing behavior during this time by adding an-
nouncements of routes at the originating time recorded in the
table. In addition, any prefixes not in the recorded table can be
withdrawn during the detected interval. If updates are not able
to be added during this time to ensure consistency, for example
when a later announcement obscures an added withdrawal,
the entire interval between consecutive tables is declared an
interval affected by a measurement artifact.
D. Update Ordering
If a non-chronological ordering of updates is detected,
the order of these updates can be permuted such that the
constructed table is consistent with the recorded table.
When a measurement artifact is discovered within the mea-
surement infrastructure of a single AS, the correlation between
router decisions may be used to predict routing behavior
during a measurement artifact [14].
VII. PARAMETER SELECTION
In this section we outline our default parameter selections
for CleanBGP which we summarize in Table II.
A. Sliding Window Length
The sliding window is used to detect session resets using
the downtime and re-establishment phases. It must be long
enough to identify a session reset from the unique prefixes and
duplicate announcements (including the possibility of multiple
partial session resets), whilst being short enough such that
normal routing behavior is differentiated from session reset
behavior. For a full-feed operational router, we found a session
generally re-established in less than 10 minutes. Routers with
partial-feeds re-establish more quickly as they have fewer
prefixes. We found after experimenting with several sliding
window lengths that detecting measurement artifacts was quite
insensitive. We use a conservative sliding window of 1 hour
to ensure multiple partial session resets can be captured.
B. Re-establishment Phase Thresholds
The unique prefixes threshold must be large enough to not
classify normal routing behavior as an artifact, whilst small
enough to detect all resets. By default we choose 50% of the
previous recorded table size as the threshold.
The duplicate announcements threshold can be lower than
the unique prefixes threshold as duplicates are less common.
We used 25% of the previous recorded table size to iden-
tify faults causing a session to persistently fail whilst re-
establishing. The low threshold is useful for detecting prob-
lems as early as possible — required for real-time applications.
We have developed an automated technique to tune these
parameters and refer the reader to [22] for further details.
C. Downtime Threshold
An update or keep-alive message must be received within
the hold-time interval for a BGP session to remain alive. Con-
sequently, a bin of hold-time duration which has no activity
is an indicator that the session is down. If no keep-alives are
recorded as with RouteViews, the downtime threshold would
Description Default Value
Sliding Window Length 1 hour
Bin Length Hold time (180 seconds for RIPE)
Unique Prefixes 50% of table size
Duplicate Prefixes 25% of table size
Downtime Threshold 1 Bin
Suspicious Bin Unique Prefixes 10% of table size or 300 updates
Suspicious Bin Duplicates 10% of table size or 300 updates
TABLE II
DEFAULT PARAMETER SETTINGS
need to be configured based on the previous non-suspicious
routing activity. When an operational router has a full feed,
it is likely the inter-arrival time of updates will be low and
consequently a low downtime threshold can be set.
D. Bin Length
Disjoint bins are used to determine suspicious intervals
when localizing measurement artifacts. We use the hold-time
as the default bin length. If no keep-alive or update is received
during this time, the BGP specification states the session is
down.
E. Suspicious Bin Thresholds
An interval is declared suspicious if it may be part of a ses-
sion reset or missing update interval. These thresholds are only
used in the localization phase of CleanBGP when an artifact
has been detected by the sliding window. In addition the char-
acteristics are considered over a shorter interval. Consequently,
we set more aggressive parameters than for the sliding window
— 10% of the table size for both duplicate announcements and
unique prefixes. Further, we have an absolute value for the
number of updates received. We found this is needed when
several monitoring sessions fail simultaneously, likely due to
the failure of a shared physical link or monitor failure, and
all re-establish in tandem. The monitor is physically unable
to write all updates to disk instantaneously — full feed BGP
neighbors currently have approximately 250, 000 prefixes and
for instance the route monitor RRC00 at RIPE has 13 of these
neighbors. Accordingly, the burst of updates appears spread
out in comparison to a single session failure. We use a low
absolute threshold together with a proportion of the table to
mark an interval as suspicious. We found 300 updates per
bin was a good default parameter, although it can be tuned
based on the limitations of the route monitor. In addition, if
no updates or keep-alives are received in the interval, we assert
the session is down and the bin is also suspicious.
VIII. RESULTS
We analyzed 260 (BGP neighbor, month) pairs of RIPE
[12], finding inconsistencies in 4.7% of the 23, 099 table
comparisons. A summary of the results is shown in Table III.
Of the 4.7% of problems during the consistency check, 81%
can be attributed to non-chronological recording of updates.
Although generally less than 10 prefixes were affected, we
found cases of up to 712 prefixes affected by this artifact.
We found several instances where updates were applied in
a permuted order with timestamps up to 16 seconds apart.
However, 76% of these prefixes had updates with an equivalent
timestamp but were written to file in the incorrect order. All
such instances of non-chronological updates we discovered
were caused by a withdrawal being written to disk prior to
an announcement, but applied to the table after.
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Monitor, Month BGP Table Consistency Missing Unknown Re-ordered Reset - Policy State Info Reset
Neighbors Comparisons Check Failures Updates Updates Unchanged/Changed Detected/Missed No State
RRC01, Jan-07 95 8274 150 (2%) 14 67 18 694 / 31 1158 / 27 45
RRC01, Apr-08 91 8102 722 (9%) 0 15 668 1121 / 102 852 / 17 827
RRC02, Apr-08 37 3282 112 (3%) 0 0 107 133 / 21 252 / 9 26
RRC02, May-08 37 3441 107 (3%) 0 0 98 121 / 20 235 / 17 22
TABLE III
ARTIFACTS AND CONSISTENCY CHECK FAILURES IN RIPE DATA.
State information indicated 2567 state changes (up and
down) in the data analyzed. CleanBGP groups numerous
session failures occurring close in time into a single interval.
In addition, a session reset may not cause an inconsistency
in the recorded table. Hence, although we detect 2243 of
such intervals, they contribute only 10% to the causes of
a consistency check failure. If a session continually fails,
identifying individual resets is difficult and the technique in
[16] is inadequate for this purpose. We claim CleanBGP to
be successful in identifying session resets if state information
is inside a localized interval. We found 97% of state infor-
mation was included within localized artifact intervals. We
investigated the cause of the 3% of state information outside
a localized interval. Part of the re-establishment process of
a session is to send a keep-alive. CleanBGP believes this is
a non-suspicious interval. Multiple session re-establishments
during a failure interval result in a number of keep-alives
appearing as normal operation. In practice, CleanBGP would
use state information to assist in the detection and localization
of measurement artifacts and hence be more accurate.
We also detected intervals which had all the characteristics
of session resets, but no state information. This may indicate
state information is missing, outside of a detected interval
(i.e. localization of the reset was inadequate) or parameters
used were overly aggressive on occasions. For the intervals we
examined, most reset intervals contained state information. In
April, a single highly active BGP neighbor resulted in 737 of
the 827 detected reset intervals without state information.
In the interval 17:33:17 and 18:25:02 UTC on January 21,
2007 no updates were recorded for any BGP neighbors of
RRC01. We did not discover any partially recorded tables.
The ‘Unknown’ category represents the consistency check
failures for which the oldest prefix discounted the possibility
of a session reset and no period of downtime was detected
indicating missing updates. We investigated these cases in-
dividually finding many were caused by updates occurring
several seconds prior to a table dump but not being recorded
in the table dump, that is the non-atomic nature of the table
spanned outside the timestamps of the recorded interval of the
table. The other artifacts described in Section III-E were also
found in this category.
IX. DISCUSSION
We have seen the benefit throughout this paper of state
information and keep-alive messages for determining measure-
ment artifacts. In addition, more frequent table dumps would
ensure even greater identification of measurement artifacts as
it would provide a greater ability to cross validate. If this
technique was undertaken automatically during the collection
process, a recorded table consistent with a constructed table
could be discarded as it provides no additional information.
This process would increase the accuracy of data, whilst not
increasing storage requirements.
We envisage CleanBGP as the first step to all BGP data
analysis. Currently the tool is in prototype stage, although we
aim to release a public version in the near future.
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